How should monetary policymakers respond to the new challenges of global integration? by Donald Brash
T
here are, of course, many aspects of global
economic integration that have quite
direct and immediate implications for the
way in which central banks go about their work.
Four issues in particular stand out.
First, economies are becoming increasingly inte-
grated through trade, particularly at a regional
level. As our conception of “the economy”takes on
less and less of a national dimension and more and
more of a regional dimension—whether it be the
EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN—it is not surprising
that parallel questions arise about whether cur-
rency arrangements should move in a similar
direction, that is, toward enlarged common cur-
rency areas. We have already seen the advent of a
common currency in much of Western Europe.
There has been increasingly widespread discussion
about the pros and cons of dollarization in the
Americas. And there has even been some discus-
sion of a common currency for East Asia. In my
own country, there appears to be quite strong sup-
port within the business community for forming a
common currency with Australia, and some sup-
port also for dollarization.
Second, questions have also arisen about
whether the increasing openness of economies is
resulting in the world becoming less prone to
inflation. Does the exposure to global competi-
tion help to suppress inflation pressures. And is
this one of the factors behind the so-called “new
paradigm,” in which the United States in particu-
lar appears able to enjoy noninflationary growth
at rates previously thought impossible?
Third, we are seeing an accelerating trend
toward genuinely global financial institutions,
including enormous entities, such as Citicorp,
HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and UBS. This is raising
some issues, including, for example, whether the
transmission of monetary policy in national bank-
ing systems dominated by foreign-owned banks
is somehow different from where banks are pre-
dominantly local in ownership, and whether the
regulatory framework is appropriate to dealing
with these global behemoths.
Fourth, in today’s globalized markets, capital
moves in amounts and at speeds that complicate
the management of monetary policy directed to
achieving internal macro objectives. Most now
accept that where there are no restrictions on cap-
ital flows, it is not possible, at least not beyond
quite narrow limits, to simultaneously direct
monetary policy to an internal objective (such as
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(such as an exchange rate target).
In my few minutes, I will focus mainly on the
fourth of these issues, as it has been the most
challenging issue facing us in New Zealand. Hav-
ing said that, it will also be evident that the issues
I have listed overlap and interact to some degree.
Substantial current account imbalances and
associated capital flows have always been a fea-
ture of the economic landscape, of course. How-
ever, with the liberalization of private capital
flows and increased trading in marketable securi-
ties, gross private capital flows during the last
decade or so have been larger, faster, and perhaps
more “concerted,” than in the preceding decades
(and probably at any time in the history of mod-
ern central banking). I don’t think there is any
need at this point in proceeding to try to support
that proposition with data. But let me just quote
a few numbers to illustrate the point in the case of
New Zealand.
In 1990, the government’s net foreign-cur-
rency debt was equivalent to 22 percent of GDP .
By 1998, that net foreign-currency debt had
fallen to zero.
On the other hand, during the same period,
nonresident holdings of New Zealand govern-
ment New Zealand dollar bonds rose from 14
percent of the total on issue to 65 percent of the
total on issue.
During the same period, outstanding euro-kiwi
issues (issues of New Zealand dollar bonds by for-
eign corporations and governments) rose from 8
percent of New Zealand’s GDP to 18 percent.
During the same period, foreign ownership of
the New Zealand equity market rose from 23
percent of market capitalization to 55 percent.
And foreign ownership of the banking system,
measured as a percentage of the total assets of the
system, went from an already high 62 percent in
1990 to 99 percent in 1998.
Note that during a decade in which New
Zealand consistently ran a current account
deficit—a deficit which never fell below about 2
percent of GDP and ended the decade at 8 per-
cent of GDP—the New Zealand government
entirely eliminated its exposure to foreign cur-
rency debt, and there was a very large increase in
the exposure of nonresidents to the New Zealand
dollar (increased foreign holdings of New
Zealand dollar government bonds, increased
issuance of euro-kiwi bonds, increased invest-
ment in the New Zealand equity market, and
increased foreign direct investment, of which the
increased foreign ownership of the banking sys-
tem is a good example).
One further point by way of background:
Although we have never totally ruled out the
possibility of intervention in the foreign exchange
market, there has, in fact, been no intervention in
the market for the New Zealand dollar since it
was floated in March 1985. I suspect that we may
be the only central bank in the world that can
claim never to have intervened directly in the
market for its currency for more than 15 years. (A
few years ago, we even looked seriously at elimi-
nating our foreign exchange reserves, on the
grounds that the best way of convincing the mar-
ket that we will not intervene is to have no capac-
ity to intervene.)
What have been the challenges?
We have thought about the challenges arising
from the openness of our economy to capital
flows under two related headings.
First, we have been concerned about the respon-
siveness of capital flows to changes in monetary
policy settings, as evidenced by the amplitude of
the exchange rate cycle over the monetary policy
cycle (see Chart 1). This has resulted in monetary
policy having a very uneven effect on the econ-
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tors. When monetary policy was tight in the mid-
1990s—as it needed to be to contain rapid
domestic demand expansion—our unusually high
real interest rates attracted demand for New
Zealand dollar assets. And the exchange rate
appreciated in real terms, on a trade-weighted
basis, by 29 percent (from the trough in early
1993 to the peak in early 1997). And then, in the
face of the negative shock to demand generated
by the Asian crisis, when monetary policy needed
to be eased, the exchange rate fell, initially back to
about where it had been in the early 1993 trough,
and then somewhat further. 
We also experienced a similar cycle in the
exchange rate in the period 1985 to 1992—a
substantial appreciation as monetary policy was
tightened, only to be followed by an equally sub-
stantial depreciation as policy was eased.
There is little doubt that firms in the tradables
sector of the economy find these cycles very diffi-
cult to cope with. Some exporters tell us that they
are now wary about expanding production, even
though the currency is currently at a very compet-
itive level because of concerns about running into
financial stress when the currency swings up
again. In other countries, the lightning rod may
be domestic firms that face increased competition
from imports as the exchange rate appreciates,
and argue the need for tariff protection. Therein
lies the challenge: how to keep the tradables sector
of the economy growing and protectionism at bay
in the face of large cycles in the exchange rate.
Second, we worry about the potential for these
exchange rate cycles to end up in tears—in other
words, in substantial disruption to the macro-
economy. A background factor here is that New
Zealand probably has the highest ratio of net
external financial obligations to GDP in the
developed world. What would be the economic
and social cost if, perhaps in response to some ini-
tially fairly trivial loss of confidence, the exchange
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amplitude of the exchange rate cycles that we
have been through during the last two decades is
no greater than that experienced by many other
countries. The United Kingdom, for example,
has experienced in recent years a trough-to-peak
real appreciation of somewhat more than the
appreciation that we experienced. The United
States has experienced an appreciation of broadly
similar magnitude. And during the 1990s Japan
experienced a larger trough-to-peak appreciation
on two occasions. But at least in the U.S. and
Japan, the ratio of international trade to GDP is
very much lower than it is in New Zealand, so
that big swings in the real exchange rate may well
cause relatively fewer stresses and strains than
they do in a small economy like New Zealand.
What has been our response?
First, we have taken some things as given:
We accept the impossibility of trying to main-
tain all three of an independent monetary policy
(an inflation target), a fixed exchange rate, and an
open capital account.
We take the view that maintaining an open
capital account is desirable insofar as there are
gains from trade in capital just as there are gains
from trade in goods and services. Being open to
capital flows has enabled New Zealanders to
spend more freely than would otherwise have
been possible, and to take advantage of invest-
ment opportunities beyond what could be
financed from our own (low) level of domestic
saving. Just as important, foreign direct invest-
ment has been a very important channel for tech-
nology and skill transfer, not least in the banking
sector itself. 
Even if that were not the case, we accept that
attempting to close the capital account would
probably be largely futile. This may not be
entirely the case for a country without developed
financial markets or one that still has capital con-
trols. But in today’s world of globalized markets
and sophisticated financial and information tech-
nology, trying to wind back the clock seems
bound to involve costs that would outweigh any
likely benefits. It is hard to put the genie back in
the bottle!
Thus, the choice for New Zealand has been
between directing monetary policy to a domestic
(price stability) objective, or to an external
(exchange rate) objective, not between having an
open or closed capital account. Our long-estab-
lished position has been that maintaining a float-
ing exchange rate, with an inflation target as
nominal anchor, best serves our interests. 
But this view is not shared universally in New
Zealand. Recently, there has been an active public
debate about whether currency union with a
major trading partner might be preferable. This
debate has been sparked, at least in part, by con-
cerns, especially in the export sector, about the
magnitude of the cycles in the New Zealand dollar
to which I have referred. Given the strong appre-
ciation of sterling against the euro in recent years,
it is hardly surprising that many British exporters
have a strong interest in the United Kingdom
entering the European Monetary Union. 
So what do we think are the lessons?
First, we have learned that the early expecta-
tions of what floating exchange rates could
deliver were overstated. Certainly, we have
learned that a floating exchange rate, combined
with fiscal prudence, does not equal current
account balance. Despite running fiscal surpluses
since 1994 and maintaining a clean float since
1985, our current account has been persistently
in deficit and is currently large, at 8 percent of
GDP , as I have mentioned.
Second, we have learned that the monetary pol-
icy independence that comes with floating does
not mean that “shocks,” whether external or
domestic, go away. Rather, the adoption of a
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transmitted to the economy in a different way.
But they still have to be coped with.
Let me illustrate. Hong Kong has a very fixed
nominal exchange rate, but its real exchange rate
appreciated between the middle of 1995 and the
middle of 1998 by 27 percent, very similar indeed
to the trough-to-peak appreciation of the New
Zealand dollar from early 1993 to early 1997. This
real appreciation stemmed, in part, from the fact
that the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the U.S.
dollar at a time when the U.S. dollar was appreciat-
ing against most other currencies, including those
of Hong Kong’s other trading partners, and, in
part, from the fact that Hong Kong’s inflation rate
was higher than that of its trading partners. Since
then, the real value of the Hong Kong dollar has
fallen (by around 17 percent), at least in part
because the shock of the Asian crisis resulted in
deflation in Hong Kong. There are lessons in this
when thinking about the implications of pegging
irrevocably to a single trading partner, as in the
case of a currency union. Currency union would
not make the real exchange rate appreciations and
depreciations go away, certainly not completely,
and maybe not at all.
Third, we have learned that since choosing one
currency arrangement (fixing) over another (float-
ing) does not, of itself, make shocks go away, then
the central issue concerns what institutional struc-
tures provide the best framework for managing
the adjustment to those shocks. Put in this way, it
seems to us that the key policy prerequisites in a
world of mobile capital are much the same
whether the exchange rate is fixed or floating.
At the most basic level, the prerequisites come
down to clear, transparent, and credible objec-
tives, and effective risk management.
To elaborate, whether the exchange rate is fixed
or floating, there is a need for a credible nominal
anchor. In one case, that anchor is the exchange
rate itself. In the other, it is nowadays generally an
inflation objective or target. In both cases, the
nominal anchor needs to be credible. To establish
that credibility, transparency helps a great deal
(markets being suspicious of what they feel is
being withheld from them), as do institutional
structures that buttress the regime (perhaps for-
mal inflation targeting structures, or a currency
board arrangement). In more generic terms, this is
all about ensuring that central banks and other
monetary authorities are subject to clear and effec-
tive governance arrangements. Clearly assigned
responsibilities and accountability structures help
give markets an added basis for having confidence
that the intended outcomes will be delivered.
Effective governance structures are also at the
heart of effective risk management, in the private
sector as well as in the public sector. Whether or
not a regime is credible depends to a substantial
extent on how well the private sector is able to
withstand swings in the exchange rate where the
exchange rate is the “variable” in the system, and
to withstand swings in interest rates where the
exchange rate is the anchor. This is, in turn, to a
large extent about governance structures that
promote effective risk management in the private
sector, and especially in the banking sector. 
In practical terms, what this mostly means is
ensuring that exchange rate risks, interest rate
risks, and credit risks are managed effectively. To
a large extent, managing exchange rate risk and
interest rate risk is about hedging. And where
hedging is not possible—as may well be the case,
for example, for exporters facing uncertain cash
flows, but potentially large medium-term
exchange rate swings—strong balance sheets are
required. It also calls for a credit culture charac-
terized by rigorous and impartial assessments of
borrowers’ ability to service the debt and gover-
nance structures, in the banking sector, corporate
sector, and public sector that promote such a
credit culture.
There is another angle to all this, and it relates
to crisis management and the vexed issue of
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in the face of the challenges of mobile capital if we
insist on trying to build response mechanisms to
volatility that result in the risk-takers being cush-
ioned from the costs of that volatility. In other
words, the economy-wide good governance struc-
tures required are not going to emerge if govern-
ments persistently absorb the risks inherent in
globalization.
This brings me to some concluding comments
focused on managing banking system risk in a
globalized world. Let me make just two points.
First, I think globalization of the banking
industry, far from making banking systems
riskier, is probably making them safer—certainly
in small countries like New Zealand. For a small
country that wants an innovative, competitive,
efficient, and safe banking system, there is likely
to be little choice other than to be open to a sub-
stantial presence by foreign banks. In our own
case, all but one of our 18 registered banks are
branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks, includ-
ing some of the world’s most highly rated banks.
I have no doubt that we are reaping substantial
benefits from that fact.
Second, there are lessons in what I have been
saying for bank supervisors (of which I am one).
Bank supervisors need to be as alert as anyone to
the tendency for public policy responses to the
risks inherent in globalization to result in risk
shifting, which invariably means from the private
sector to the public sector. Rather than more and
better supervision of the actual activities of banks,
and endless codes of best practice for that supervi-
sion, I would prefer to see more emphasis being
given to the need for all parties to understand
their own risks, and for responsibility for dealing
with those risks to rest where they arise. That is
the approach we have adopted, and, again, I have
no doubt that it is serving us well.
We place absolutely no restrictions on the
extent to which banks operating in New Zealand
carry open foreign exchange positions, and no
restrictions on the extent to which they finance
their operations offshore. In recent years, much of
the growth in bank lending has been financed by
direct foreign currency borrowing. And yet, we
know that the banks carry absolutely minimal
open foreign exchange positions. Official statis-
tics released a few weeks ago suggested that, of
the total foreign debt outstanding at March 31,
2000—a considerable part of which was owed by
banks—97 percent was subject to some kind of
exchange rate hedge, roughly one-third by means
of some form of natural hedge and roughly two-
thirds through the financial markets—which, of
course, is where the willingness of foreigners to
carry an exposure to the New Zealand dollar has
been relevant. We believe that is an important
benefit of continuing to insist that foreign
exchange risks are the responsibility of those who
enter into foreign exchange contracts.
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